جزئیات آسیب‌پذیری

خلاصه‌ی فارسی برای این آسیب‌پذیری هنوز تهیه نشده است.

Workflows triggered by a pull request review were read from the commit named in the review's `commit_id`, while the fork restrictions were decided by the reviewed pull request, and the commit was not checked to belong to that pull request. A user with read access to a repository could place a commit of their own in it, through a fork pull request or an AGit push, and submit a review naming that commit on a pull request whose head branch is in the same repository. On instances with a runner serving the repository, the attacker's workflow then ran without approval, received the Actions secrets of the repository and its owner, and got a `GITEA_TOKEN` with write access to the repository. Review-triggered workflows now run on the pull request head.

• https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-32h8-5xqg-h466 vendor-advisory
• https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/40099 patch
• https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/40117 patch
• https://blog.gitea.com/release-of-28.3.0/ release-notes
• https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v28.3.0 release-notes